House BillHR 3716Government studies and investigationsCongressional oversight
Systemic Risk Authority Transparency Act
INTRO JUN 4· LAST ACTION DEC 2
READING
5MIN
COSPONSORS
0
READER REACTIONS0 TOTAL
NO VOTES YET · BE THE FIRST
One chamber only
LEGISLATIVE PROGRESS
STEP 4 / 8
Introduced
In Committee
Reported
Passed House
Passed Senate
Conference
To President
Became Law
WHAT THE BILL DOES
AI-written
This bill matters because it addresses a critical concern for many voters: the handling of large bank failures that can ripple through the entire economy. When the government decides a bank is "too big to fail" and uses special powers to intervene, it often involves a significant cost or risk to the public. Currently, the detailed reasons and processes behind these interventions aren't always fully transparent.
If this bill becomes law, voters would gain a clearer understanding of why and how these extraordinary measures are taken, including insights into potential bank mismanagement, regulatory oversights, and the broader economic impacts. This increased transparency could lead to greater accountability for both banks and their regulators, potentially fostering a more stable financial system and reducing the likelihood or severity of future crises. Without it, the public and Congress would continue to rely on less comprehensive and independent analyses of these high-stakes financial events.
KEY PROVISIONS
5AI-extracted
PROVISION 01
Requires the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to conduct an independent review and report to Congress after the systemic risk authority is used for a bank failure.
Provides an unbiased, external analysis of the causes of the failure and the government's response, helping Congress and the public understand complex financial events.
PROVISION 02
Mandates that the appropriate federal banking agency (e.g., FDIC, Federal Reserve) also submit reports to Congress detailing the bank's failure, including past examination reports and identified mismanagement.
Offers an internal perspective from the direct regulator, including potential self-assessment of supervisory shortcomings and recommendations for system improvements.
PROVISION 03
Stipulates that these agency reports must identify any mismanagement by the failed bank's executives and board, and any supervisory or regulatory shortcomings by the agency itself.
Aims to hold both bank leadership and regulatory bodies accountable for their roles in a bank's failure, fostering a culture of responsibility.
PROVISION 04
Establishes specific deadlines for these reports (60/180 days for GAO; 90/210 days for agencies) and allows for a 60-day extension for agencies under certain conditions.
Ensures timely delivery of critical information to Congress for oversight while providing flexibility for agencies during ongoing financial crises.
PROVISION 05
Requires agencies to publish report materials to the fullest extent possible to promote transparency, with specific consultation procedures if materials are withheld from public release.
Balances the need for public transparency regarding bank failures with the protection of sensitive information, ensuring congressional oversight even if some details are not fully public.
This bill matters because it addresses a critical concern for many voters: the handling of large bank failures that can ripple through the entire economy. When the government decides a bank is "too big to fail" and uses special powers to intervene, it often involves a significant cost or risk to the public. Currently, the detailed reasons and processes behind these interventions aren't always fully transparent.
If this bill becomes law, voters would gain a clearer understanding of why and how these extraordinary measures are taken, including insights into potential bank mismanagement, regulatory oversights, and the broader economic impacts. This increased transparency could lead to greater accountability for both banks and their regulators, potentially fostering a more stable financial system and reducing the likelihood or severity of future crises. Without it, the public and Congress would continue to rely on less comprehensive and independent analyses of these high-stakes financial events.
KEY PROVISIONS
AI-extracted
high
Requires the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to conduct an independent review and report to Congress after the systemic risk authority is used for a bank failure.
Provides an unbiased, external analysis of the causes of the failure and the government's response, helping Congress and the public understand complex financial events.
high
Mandates that the appropriate federal banking agency (e.g., FDIC, Federal Reserve) also submit reports to Congress detailing the bank's failure, including past examination reports and identified mismanagement.
Offers an internal perspective from the direct regulator, including potential self-assessment of supervisory shortcomings and recommendations for system improvements.
high
Stipulates that these agency reports must identify any mismanagement by the failed bank's executives and board, and any supervisory or regulatory shortcomings by the agency itself.
Aims to hold both bank leadership and regulatory bodies accountable for their roles in a bank's failure, fostering a culture of responsibility.
med
Establishes specific deadlines for these reports (60/180 days for GAO; 90/210 days for agencies) and allows for a 60-day extension for agencies under certain conditions.
Ensures timely delivery of critical information to Congress for oversight while providing flexibility for agencies during ongoing financial crises.
med
Requires agencies to publish report materials to the fullest extent possible to promote transparency, with specific consultation procedures if materials are withheld from public release.
Balances the need for public transparency regarding bank failures with the protection of sensitive information, ensuring congressional oversight even if some details are not fully public.
Not later than 60 days after a determination, and again 180 days thereafter
GAO review and report to Congress on systemic risk determination
Not later than 90 days after a determination, and again 210 days thereafter
Appropriate Federal banking agency report to Congress on systemic risk determination
An additional 60 days, if facing ongoing circumstances requiring prioritization of U.S. banking system stability and Congress is notified
Federal banking agency report deadline extension
GLOSSARY
AI-written
Systemic Risk Authority
A special power granted to federal financial regulators to take extraordinary actions when a bank's failure is determined to pose a serious risk to the stability of the entire financial system.
Insured Depository Institution
A bank or financial institution whose customer deposits are protected by federal insurance, typically by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), up to a certain amount per account.
Comptroller General of the United States
The head of the Government Accountability Office (GAO), an independent agency that investigates how the federal government spends taxpayer dollars.
Appropriate Federal Banking Agency
The specific federal government agency responsible for overseeing and regulating a particular bank, such as the Federal Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).
Supervisory Determination
A formal finding, judgment, or decision made by a banking regulator concerning a bank's financial health, compliance with rules, or operational practices.
Federal Deposit Insurance Act
A federal law that created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and establishes the framework for insuring deposits in U.S. banks.
ACTION TIMELINE
13 EVENTS
DEC 2, 25
Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.
INTROREFERRAL
DEC 1, 25
Mr. Davidson moved to suspend the rules and pass the bill, as amended.
FLOOR
DEC 1, 25
Considered under suspension of the rules. (consideration: CR H4947-4948)
FLOOR
DEC 1, 25
DEBATE - The House proceeded with forty minutes of debate on H.R. 3716.
